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MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC
Operating While Under the Influence: Provide a Comprehensive
Revision, Modernization, and Reform of the Laws of This State
Relating to Operating Motor Vehicles While Under the Influence of
Alcohol, Drugs, or Other Substances; to Provide for Implied
Consent to Chemical Testing; to Provide Definitions; to Provide
for the Adoption ofSuch Laws by Ordinance by Political
Subdivisions; to Providefor the Discretion of the Court to Accept
Certain Pleas; to Providefor the Publication of the Photographs
and Fact of Conviction for Certain Offenders; to Amend Various
Provisions of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, so as to
Conform Such Provisions to the Provisions of this Act; to Provide
for the Applicability and Effect of this Act; to Provide an Effective
date; to Repeal Conflicting Laws; and for Other Purposes
CODE SECTIONS:

BILL NUMBER:

SUMMARY:

O.C.G.A. § 6-2-5.1 (amended); 12-3315 (amended); 15-11-66 (amended);
15-21-112, 149 (amended); 16-10-51
(amended); 17-6-1, 2 (amended); 1710-3.1 (amended); 17-15-7, 8, 10
(amended); 20-2-984.2 (amended); 339-43 (amended); 40-1-8 (new); 40-2136 (amended); 40-5-1, 2, 24, 52, 55,
57.1,58,62,63,63.1,64,66,67,69,
75, 85, 142, 148.1, 151, 152, 153
(amended); 40-5-67.1, 67.2 (repealed);
40-6-3, 291, 391, 392, 393, 393.1, 394
(amended); 40-6-391.2 to -391.3
(repealed); 40-6-410 to -25 (new); 424-7 (amended), 42-8-34, 111, 112
(amended); 50-5-200 to -210 (new)
SB 502
The bill proposed the consolidation of
existing nUl laws in Georgia and the
addition of new sections to the Georgia
Code that would address perceived
ambiguities caused by recent Georgia
223
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court decisions. Specifically, the bill
was intended to facilitate the collection
of admissible evidence by law
enforcement officers in DUI cases. For
example, the bill proposed the
availability
of implied
consent
chemical testing where there is
"probable cause" to believe that a
suspect is operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol,
drugs, or other substances in certain
circumstances. Further, the bill would
have allowed for the admissibility of
chemical test results where the
defendant driver did not consent to the
testing, but a valid warrant was
obtained. Additionally, the bill would
have allowed for the admissibility of
chemical test results where the law
enforcement officer misread or failed to
read portions of the implied consent
notice.
History

The current DUI laws in Georgia span multiple titles and sections
of the Georgia Code. 1 Georgia's implied consent provisions in its
DUI laws were at the forefront of the proposed legislation in the 2006
term. 2 The history of the DUI laws in Georgia and recent court cases
interpreting the existing law shed light on the reasons for the proposal
of Senate Bill 502. 3

1. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 6-2-5.1 (2005); 15-21-112 (2005); 17-10-3.1 (2005); 40-5-52 (2005).
2. See SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.; HB 1222, as introduced, 2006 Ga.

Gen. Assem.
3. See 1968 Ga. Laws 448; O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-55, -67.1 (2005).
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Schmerber v. California4
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer
can forcibly take blood from a suspect, so long as the officer has
probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed the criminal
offense of driving an automobile while intoxicated. 5 In the case of
Schmerber v. California, the petitioner was arrested while he was at a
hospital seeking treatment for injuries suffered in a car accident. 6 At
the direction of a police officer, a hospital physician withdrew a
sample of his blood. 7 The report of his blood alcohol percentage was
admitted at trial, and he was convicted. 8 The petitioner objected to
the admissibility of the report, claiming that it violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. 9
The Court first noted that a suspect's Fourth Amendment right to
be free of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the
compelled withdrawal of blood. 10 The Court then asked whether the
police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the test, and
whether the means and ~rocedures employed in taking petitioner's
blood were reasonable. I Finding the ends justified (there was
probable cause to suspect petitioner of a criminal violation) and the
means reasonable (the attempt to secure evidence was an appropriate
incident to his arrest), the Court concluded that no violation had taken
place. 12

Implied Consent Laws
In the wake of this decision, Georgia adopted "implied consent"

laws to minimize the risk of violent confrontations between police,
medical personnel, and suspected impaired drivers.13 These laws
4. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
5. Id. at 767-68.
6. Id. at 758.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 759.
9. Id.
10. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
II. Id. at 768.
12. Id. at 768-72.
13. See 1968 Ga. Laws 448; Adam Ferrell, Rodriguez v. State: Addressing Georgia's Implied
Consent Requirements for Non-English-Speaking Drivers, 54 MERCER L. REv. 1253, 1257 (2003)
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provide for consequences such as license suspension if the driver
refuses to consent to testing, and the laws provide for the admission
into evidence of the fact that the driver refused testing. 14 In Georgia,
a defendant's refusal to submit to testing gives rise to an inference
that a test would have shown the presence of a prohibited substance. IS
An often-cited section of Georgia's implied consent laws reads:
[A]ny person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways
or elsewhere throughout this state shall be deemed to have given
consent, subject to Code Section 40-6-392, to a chemical test or
tests of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances
for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or any
other drug, if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged
to have been committed in violation of Code Section 40-6-391 or
if such person is involved in any traffic accident resulting in
serious injuries or fatalities. 16

Several recent cases have called into question the meaning and
application of these laws. 17
Cooper v. State18
In 2003, the Georgia Supreme Court held a portion of Georgia's
implied consent law unconstitutional. I9 In August of 2000, two

drivers were involved in a head-on collision in Barrow County,
Georgia. 2o The trooper investigating the scene discovered that one
driver had suffered a broken arm and, fursuant to Georgia law,
administered a blood test to both drivers. I The trooper was acting
(stating that Georgia's original implied consent laws have changed very little since first introduced in
1968).
14. See Ferrell, supra note 13, at 1257.
15. See Kelly v. State, 528 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
16. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 (2005).
17. See Audio Recording of Senate Proceedings, Feb. 23, 2006 (remarks by Sen. William Hamrick),
http://www.georgia.gov/00/artic1e10,2086,4802_6107103_4 7120055,OO.htrnl,
[hereinafter Senate
Audio].
18. Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003).
19. Id.at607.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 607-08.
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under Code section 40-5-55, which dictates that a person involved in
any traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities has, by
operation of law, given consent to chemical testing?2 One of the
drivers, Carey Don Cooper, tested positive for cocaine, and was
convicted for driving under the influence of cocaine?3
Prior to trial Cooper moved to suppress the blood test results,
arguing that "to the extent that O.C.G.A. [section] 40-5-55 allowed
the state to require a person to consent to a [blood test] without
probable cause, the statute was unconstitutional under the State and
Federal Constitutions.,,24 The trial court denied the motion?5 On
appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the relevant
provision of Code section 40-5-55 was unconstitutional under
"Article I, Section I, Paragraph XIII of the 1983 Georgia Constitution
and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States because it authorizes a search and seizure without
probable cause.,,26 The Court emphasized that "[a] suspect's Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures
applies to the compelled withdrawal of blood.,,27 Because the statute
authorized a search without probable cause, based solely on the
occurrence of a traffic accident, the court deemed it
unconstitutional. 28

State v. Colliel 9
In 2005, the Georgia Supreme Court held that, under Georgia law,
if a suspect refuses to submit to chemical testing, a police officer
cannot obtain a search warrant to compel him to submit to such
testing. 3o In State v. Collier, the evidence at trial showed that the
defendant drove through a red light and collided with another car,

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.

29.
30.

Id. at 608.
Id. at 607-08.
Cooper, 587 S.E.2d at 608.
Id.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 608 (citing Welch v. State. 331 S.E.2d 573 (Ga.
Id. at 612.
State v. Collier, 612 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. 2005).
Id. at 284.
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killing both passengers of that car. 31 The defendant fled the scene, but
was later caught by police. 32 After police gave the imf:lied consent
warning, the defendant refused to submit to testing. 3 When the
police threatened to get a search warrant and use a catheter to collect
the necessary samples, Collier consented, and was later convicted of
vehicular homicide. 34
On appeal, the defendant argued that he was misled by police
because they could not compel him to submit to testing if he would
not consent. 35 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed. 36 The court
pointed to the language of Code section 40-5-67.1, which provides,
"If a person . . . refuses, upon the request of a law enforcement
officer, to submit to a chemical test ... no test shall be given.'.37 The
court held under the plain meaning of this law that if an individual
does not consent to the designated test, then no test can be
administered, under warrant or otherwise. 38 Georgia's implied
consent statute, therefore, provides greater protection for citizens than
either the Georgia Constitution or the U.S. Constitution. 39
Hough v. State40

Again, in 2005, the Georgia Supreme Court was asked to rule on
the applicability of Georgia's implied consent laws. 41 In January of
2003, Bryan Reid Handschuh drove off the side of the road and his
truck flipped into an embankment. 42 The investigating officer noticed
that the truck smelled like alcohol and he discovered a half gallon
bottle of Crown Royal, most of which had been consumed. 43 At the
31. Id. at 282; see also Bill Hamrick, Editorial, Keeping Drunks off Road, DOUGLAS DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 10, 2006.
32. Collier, 612 S.E.2d at 282.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 284.
37. Collier, 612 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1 (2005) (emphasis in original».
38. Id. at 283-84.
39. See id. at 284.
40. Hough v. State, 620 S.E.2d 380 (Ga. 2005) (affinning in part and disapproving in part of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in Handschuh v. State, 607 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004».
41. [d. at 382-83.
42. [d. at 386.
43. [d.
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hospital, the officer infonned Handschuh of his implied consent
rights and asked him to submit to a blood test. 44 Handschuh refused
to submit, and six days later he was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol. 45 Evidence of his refusal to submit to the blood
test was introduced at trial, and Handschuh was convicted. 46
On appeal, Handschuh argued that the language of Georgia's
implied consent statutes, the implied consent warning cannot be
given until suspect is actually arrested. 47 The Georgia Supreme
Court agreed, noting that the plain and unambiguous wording of the
statute's language mandates that a suspect must be under arrest
before his implied consent rights are read to him.48 The statute limits
that requirement, however, to situations in which the suspect has not
been involved in an accident involving serious injury or fatalities. 49 If
the suspect has been in such an accident, held the court, nothing in
Georgia's implied consent laws required arrest as a precondition to
implied consent testing - probable cause alone is sufficient to lead
to warning of implied consent. 50
Response to Cooper, Collier, and Hough
In the 2006 session of the General Assembly, several groups
supported legislation to respond to these recent court decisions. 51
Senator Bill Hamrick, a sponsor of SB 502, noted that these decisions
severely restrict law enforcement officers in their efforts to gather the
evidence necessary to convict drunk drivers. 52 Specifically, Senator
Hamrick pointed to an incident in his home district in which the
44. !d.

45. Id. (Handschuh would not respond directly to the officer's requests, but he told a nurse that he
would not allow his blood to be drawn).
46. Handschuh v. State, 607 S.E.2d 899, 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005), aff'd in part, Hough v. State, 620
S.E.2d 380 (Ga. 2005).
47. Hough, 620 S.E.2d at 384-87.
48. [d.

49. Id.
50. Id.

at 382. The limitations of Cooper are no longer at issue when there is probable cause. Id. at
386.
51. See Interview with Irene Muon, Douglas County District Attorney's Office, Mar. 22, 2006
[hereinafter Munn Interview] (stating that Governor's Office of Highway Safety, the District Attorneys
Association, and the Solicitor's Association were all in favor of new legislation).
52. See Hamrick, supra note 31; see also Telephone Interview with Sen. Bill Hamrick, Senate Dist.
No. 30 (Apr. 17,2006) [hereinafter Hamrick Interview]; Senate Audio, supra note 17.
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Georgia Supreme Court excluded evidence needed to convict a man
who killed a child and grandmother while driving under the influence
of cocaine. 53 That incident, culminatin~ in the Collier decision,
prompted Senator Hamrick to take action. 4
At the same time, the Governor's Office of Highway Safety was
conducting a five-month study to focus on the controversies and
issues involved in Georgia's DUI laws. 55 The study found that over
five hundred Georgia drivers are killed in alcohol-related crashes
annually, and that over thirty percent of the fatal crashes in Georgia
involve alcohol. 56 Working with that office, Senator Hamrick
proposed SB 502 to serve as a comprehensive overhaul of Georgia's
DUI laws, gathering all DUI-related provisions together in one
section, and to address and correct the obstacles presented under
current implied consent laws. 57
Bill Tracking
HB 1222

At the same time that SB 502 was introduced in the Senate, HB
1222 was introduced in the House. 58 HB 1222 was introduced by
Representatives Mark Hatfield, Barry Fleming, David Ralston,
Timothy Bearden, Charlice Byrd, and Stan Watson of the 177th,
117th, 7th, 68th, 20th, and 91st districts, respectively. 59 HB 1222 was
described as an implied consent bill that proposed to provide a
comprehensive revision and reform of DUI laws in Georgia. 6o HB
1222 was first read in the House on February 2, 2006. 61 The House
Committee on Judiciary Non-Civil reported favorably on a substitute
53. See Hamrick interview, supra note 52.
54. See id
55. Press Release, Governor's Office of Highway Safety, Why Is SB 502 Needed? (undated) (on file
with The Georgia State University Law Review).

56. Id
57. See Hamrick interview, supra note 52.
58. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1222, Feb. 2, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006).
59. See HB 1222, as introduced, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem; Georgia General Assembly - HB 1222,
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legisl2005_06/sum/hbI222.htrn (last visited November 16, 2006).
60. See HB 1222, as introduced, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
61. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1222, Feb. 2, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006).
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bill on March 8, 2006. 62 Following the third reading of the bill on
March 13, 2006, the bill failed to pass by a narrow margin. 63 This
vote foreshadowed the fate of Senate Bill 502. 64

SB 502
Senate Bill 502 was introduced by Senators Bill Hamrick, Joseph
Carter, Preston Smith, Judson Hill, and John Wiles of the 30th, 13th,
52nd, 32nd, and 37th districts, respectively.6s Like HB 1222, SB 502
was read for the first time on February 2, 2006. 66 On February 15,
2006, the Senate Committee on Public Safety and Homeland Security
favorably reported the committee substititute to SB 502. 67 Following
a second reading of the bill on February 16,2006 and a third reading
on February 22, 2006, on February 23, 2006 in a near-unanimous
vote the Senate passed and adopted SB 502 by committee
substitute. 68
SB 502 was read for first time in the House on February 28,2006,
and was read again the following day.69 After much delay and
deliberation, the bill could not garner enough support in the House
and was eventually taken off the table. 7o

62. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1222, Mar. 8, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006);
Georgia General Assembly - HB 1222, http://www.legis.ga.govllegisl200S_06/sumlhbI222.htm (last

visited November 16,2006).
63. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 1222 (Mar. 13,2006) (76 Yea, 84 Nay, 13
Not Voting, 7 Excused); Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 1222 (Mar. 13, 2006)
(Motion to Reconsider) (66 Yea, 92 Nay, IS Not Voting, 7 Excused).
64. See S8 502, as introduced, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
65. SB 502, as introduced, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
66. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Feb. 2, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006).
67. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Feb. 15,2006 (Mar. 30,2006); Georgia
General Assembly - SB 502, http://www.legis.ga.govllegisl2005_06/surnlsb502.htm (last visited
November 16, 2006).
68. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Feb. 16,2006 (Mar. 30,2006); State of
Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Feb. 22, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006); see also Georgia Senate
Voting Record, S8 502 (Feb. 22, 2006) (reflecting that only Sen. Gloria Butler of the 55th District voted
against the Bill). The committee substitute is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 79-130.
69. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Feb. 28, 2006 (Mar. 30,2006); State of
Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Mar. 01, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006).
70. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 502, Mar. 01,2006 (Mar. 30, 2006); Muon
Interview, supra note 51.
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HE 1275

Even though HB 1222 and SB 502 were both defeated, proponents
of stricter and more clarified DUI legislation won a small victory
when an implied consent-related amendment was approved in HB
1275. 71 HB 1275 was sponsored by Representatives Vance Smith,
Johnny Floyd, Ed Rynders, Tom Graves and Mickey Channell of the
129th, 147th, 152nd, 12th, and 116th districts, respectively.72 HB
1275 was a bill purporting to require the revocation of a commercial
drivers license if the holder of the license was in violation of Code
sections 16-8-2 through 16-8-9, defining crimes of theft. 73 HB 1275
was passed and adopted by the House on March 2, 2006 and adopted
by the Senate on March 27, 2006. 74
Following the termination ofSB 502, Senators Joseph Carter of the
13th District, Ronnie Chance of the 16th District, and Jim Whitehead,
Sr. of the 24th District proposed an amendment to HB 1275. 75 As
amended, HB 1275 would insert new Code section 40-5-67.1 that
would read: "Nothing in this Code Section shall be deemed to
preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of
Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search
warrant as authorized by the Constitution or laws of this state or the
United States.,,76 The amenedment was adopted by the Senate and
amended HB 1275 was passed by the Senate on March 27th, 2006. 77
The House adopted HB 1275 as passed by the Senate, including the
floor amendment, on March 28, 2006. 78 Presumably, this amendment
was in response to the Georgia Supreme Court's holding in State v.
Collier that evidence obtained by search warrants after implied
consent is refused is not admissible. 79

71. See HB 1275, as passed, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
72. See HB 1275, as introduced, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
73. Id; O.C.G.A. §§16-8-2 through 16-8-9 (2006 Supp.).

74. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1275, Mar. 2, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006); State of
Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1275, Mar. 27, 2006 (Mar. 30,2006).
75. HB 1275, (SFA), 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
76. HB 1275, as passed, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
77. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1275, Mar. 27, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006).
78. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 1275, Mar. 28, 2006 (Mar. 30, 2006).
79. See Hamrick Interview, supra note 52; see also State v. Collier, 612 S.E.2d 281 (Ga. 2005).
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The Act

Section 1, if passed, would have provided legislative intent. 80
Section 1-1, if passed, would have amended Title 40 by adding new
Code Section 40_1_8. 81 This new section would have prohibited the
operation of motor vehicles while under the influence of alcohol,
drugs, or other substances. 82 This new section would have also
provided for implied consent for chemical testing. 83
Section 1-2 would have amended Title 40 by adding new Article 9
to Chapter 5. 84 This new section would have provided relevant
definitions. 85 This new section would have provided for chemical
testing for persons suspected of driving under the influence of
alcohol, drugs, or other substances. 86
This new section would have provided for the procedures to obtain
and perform such tests. 87 This new section would have provided for
the administration of warnings in regard to such tests. 88 If passed, this
new section would have provided for independent tests under certain
circumstances. 89
Section 1-2 would have provided for certain qualifications for
persons performing such tests and certain instruments used in said
testing. 9o This new section would also have provided for the
admission into evidence of the results of such tests and certifications
of such testing instruments. 91 If passed, this new section would also
have provided for certain immunities.92
If passed, section 1-2 would have provided for certain
disclosures. 93 This new section would have also provided for the
taking of the driver's license of the person thought to be operating a
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

!d.
SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
87. !d.

88. Id.
89. !d.

90. Id.
91. !d.
92. SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.

93. Id.
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motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other
substances. 94 This new section would also have provided for
temporary driving permits under certain circumstances. 9s
Section 1-2 would have also provided for certain reports for law
enforcement officers and COurt. 96 This new section would have
provided for the suspension and revocation of a driver's license under
certain circumstances. 97 This new section would have provided for
procedures for such revocations and suspensions. 98
This new section would have provided for hearings in certain
circumstances. 99 If passed, this new section would have provided for
reinstatement of a driver's license in certain circumstances. lOo This
new section would have provided for compensation for law
enforcement officers for attending hearings. 101
Section 1-3, if passed, would have amended Title 40 by
redesignating the existing provisions of Article 15 of Chapter 6,
relating to serious traffic offenses, as Part I, and inserting a new Part
11. 102 This new section would have provided for sanctions and
penalties for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, drugs, or other substances. 103 This new section would have
prohibited the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol, drugs, or other substances while transporting a child under
the age of 14 years. 104
Section 1-3 would have prohibited the operation of a school bus
while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other substances. lOS
The new section would have provided that legal entitlement to use
alcohol, marijuana, or other drugs shall not constitute a defense. l06

94. Id.
9S. Id.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. sa S02, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. [d.
102. [d.
103. [d.
104. sa S02, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
lOS. [d.
106. [d.
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Furthennore, this new section would have provided that certain pleas
shall constitute prior convictions for sentencing purposes. \07
If passed, section 1-3 would have provided for the discretion of the
court to accept certain pleas. 108 This new section would have
provided for the adoption of such laws by ordinance by political
subdivisions. l09 In addition, this new section would have provided for
the publication of the photographs and fact of conviction for certain
offenders. I 10
If passed, section 1-3 would have provided for the admissibility of
certain evidence. III Additionally, this new section would have
provided for the seizure and forfeiture of certain vehicles operated by
certain violators. I 12
Sections 2-1 to 2-19, if passed, would have amended various code
sections by updating citations in order to remain consistent with the
sections of this proposed Act. 113
Section 2-20, if passed, would have amended Title 40 of the
Georgia Code by striking Code section 40-5-55, relating to implied
consent to chemical tests, and renders that Code section reserved. 114
Section 2-21 to 2-27, if passed, would have updated various Code
sections so that citations would remain consistent. 115 Section 2-28, if
passed, would have amended Title 40 of the O.C.G.A. by striking
Code section 40-5-67, rendering it reserved. I 16
Section 2-29, if passed, would have amended Title 40 of the
Georgia Code by repealing Code Section 40-5-67.1, relating to
107. fd.
108. fa.
\09. fd.
110. sa 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
lll. fd.
112. fd.
113. See sa 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., §§ 2.1 - 2.19, amending Code
sections 6-2-5.1 (Supp. 2005),12-3-315 (Supp. 2005), 15-11-66 (Supp. 2005), 15-21-112 (Supp. 2005),
12-3-315 (Supp. 2005), 15-11-66 (Supp. 2005), 15-21-112 (Supp. 2005),15-21-149 (Supp. 2005),17-61 (Supp. 2005), 17-6-2 (Supp. 2005), 17-10-3.1 (Supp. 2005), 17-15-7 (Supp. 2005), 17-15-8 (Supp.
2005), 17-15-10 (Supp. 2005), 20-2-984.2 (Supp. 2005), 33-9-43 (Supp. 2005), 40-2-136 (Supp. 2005),
40-5-1 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-2 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-24 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-52 (Supp. 2005).
114. Compare sa 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55
(Supp. 2005).
115. See sa 502 as passed by the Senate, §§ 2-21 - 2-27, amending Code sections 40-5-57.1 (Supp.
2005), 40-5-58 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-62 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-63 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-63.1 (Supp. 2005), 405-64 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-66 (Supp. 2005).
116. Compare sa 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67
(Supp. 2005).
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chemical tests. 117 Section 2-30, if passed, would have amended Title
40 of the Georgia Code by repealing Code section 40-5-67.2, relating
to terms and conditions for suspension of license under subsection (c)
of Code section 40-5-67.1. 118
Section 2-31, if passed, would have amended Title 40 of the
Georgia Code by striking Code section 40-5-69, relating to
circumstances not affecting suspension by operation of law, and
replacing it with a new Code Section 40-5-69. 119 Sections 2-32 to 237, if passed, would have amended various Code sections to be
consistent with the applicable sections ofthe proposed Act l20
Section 2-38, if passed, would have amended Title 40 of the
Georgia Code by striking Code section 40-5-153, rendering the
section reserved. 121 Section 2-39 to 2-40, if passed, would have
amended Title 40 ofthe Georgia Code by updating Code citations. 122
Section 2-41, if passed, would have amended Title 40 by striking
Code section 40-6-391, rendering it reserved.123 Section 2-42, if
passed, would have amended Title 40 by repealing Code section 406-391.1, relating to entry of plea of nolo contendre. 124
Section 2-43, if passed, would have amended Title 40 by repealing
Code section 40-6-391.2, relating to seizure and forfeiture of a motor
vehicle by a habitual violator. 125 Section 2-44, if passed, would have
amended Title 40 by repealing Code section 40-6-391.3, relating to
the penalty for a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol

117. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1
(Supp. 2005).

118. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.2
(Supp. 2005).

119. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-69
(Supp. 2005).
120. See S8 502, as passed by the Senate, §§ 2.32 - 2.37, amending Code sections 40-5-85 (Supp.
2005),40-5-142 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-148.1 (Supp. 2005),40-5-151 (Supp. 2005), 40-5-152 (Supp. 2005).
121. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-5-153
(Supp. 2005).
122. See S8 502, as passed by the Senate, §§ 2.39 to 2.40, amending Code sections 40-6-3 (Supp_
2005),40-6-291 (Supp. 2005).
123. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391
(Supp. 2005).
124. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391.1
(Supp. 2005).
125. Compare S8 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391.2
(Supp. 2005).
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or drugs while driving a school bus. 126 Section 2-45, if passed, would
have amended Title 40 by striking Code section 40-6-392, rendering
it reserved. 127
Section 2-46 to 2-52, if passed, would have amended Title 40 by
updating applicable citations. 128
Section 3-1, if passed, would have ensured that new Code sections
would not alter any existing proceedings, sentences, etc. 129 Section 32, if passed, this section would have provided an effective date.130
Section 3-3, if passed, would have repealed conflicting laws. 131

Analysis
SB 502 was introduced to the Senate as a comprehensive "implied
132
consent" bill.
Senator Bill Hamrick, who co-sponsored SB 502,
classified the purpose of the bill during the March 13, 2006 Senate
floor debate as "renumbering and recomposing current law as it is
applied in nUl cases" in Georgia. 133 According to Senator Hamrick,
SB 502 would close loopholes used by criminals who break nUl
laws, prevent criminals from avoiding punishment due to
technicalities, and respond to recent appellate court decisions whose
interpretations of nUl laws have severely restricted law enforcement
officers in their efforts to obtain needed evidence to convict drunk
drivers. 134
The proponents of SB 502 expressed that they were primarily
concerned with technicalities in the existing nUl laws that were
126. Compare SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391.3
(Supp. 2005).
127. Compare SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., with O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392
(Supp. 2005).
128. See SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., amending Code sections 40-6-393
(Supp. 2005), 40-6-393.1 (Supp. 2005), 40-6-394 (Supp. 2005),42-4-7 (Supp. 2005), 42-8-34 (Supp.
2005), 42-8-111 (Supp. 2005), 42-8-112 (Supp. 2005).
129. SB 502, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Interview with Sen. Gloria Butler, Senate Dist. No. 55 (Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Butler
Interview].
133. See Senate Audio, supra note 17 ("CurrentlY, it's more difficult to try a DUI case than it is a
murder case because there's a lot of technicalities in the law, and because it's spread out through a lot of
code sections.").
134. /d.; see also Governor's Office of Highway Safety, supra note 55.
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DUI convictions for seemingly trivial
SB 502 aimed to relieve confusion in the area
136
notices.
The current DUI laws provide three

allowing motorists to evade
reasons. 135 Particularly,
of implied consent

different implied consent warnings that law enforcement officers
137
must read to drivers prior to seeking their consent for testing.
In
the past, courts have routinely suppressed important test results from
evidence in situations where the wrong consent notice was read to the
accused, or where the court determined that a portion of the notice
138
SB 502 proposed that the three warnings of the

was misleading.

current law be streamlined into one warning to avoid confusion and
provide fewer loopholes for

DUI

suspects. 139

The proposed bill

would not differentiate between drivers based on age or drivers
14o
license c1assification.
The bill also emphasized that the warning
would not be required to be read exactly as it appears in the statute,
"so long as the substance of the notice remains unchanged.,,141

135. See Senate Audio, supra note 17 (remarks of Sen. Hamrick).
136. See id.; see also SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the
addition of Code section 40-5-202).
137. See O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67. I (b) (2004) (providing three various warnings to be read depending on
whether the suspect is (a) over the age of21; (b) under the age of21; or (c) driving a commercial motor
vehicle).
138. See Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003) (holding that a driver's consent to withdraw
blood was invalid where officer misled defendant concerning his implied consent rights); Richards v.
State, 500 S.E.2d 581, 582-83 (Ga. 1998) (holding that evidence of chemical breath test was
inadmissible where officer did not give proper implied consent warning); State v. Chun, 594 S.E.2d 732,
733 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Peirce, 571 S.E.2d 826 (2002); State v. Terry, 511 S.E.2d 608, 610-11
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Parrish v. State, 456 S.E.2d 283, 283 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Carswell v. State, 320
S.E.2d 249, 252 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that where defendant was never informed of his right to
refuse testing, defendant's blood alcohol test results were inadmissible).
139. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the insertion of
Code subsection 40-5-202(c»; see also, Senate Audio, supra note 17. Code subsection 40-5-202(c)
would have read as the following:
At the time a chemical test or tests are requested, the following implied consent notice
shall be read to the person: Georgia law requires you to submit to state administered
chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance for the purpose of
determining if you are operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs
or with a prohibited substance in your body. If you submit to this testing, the results may
be used against you in a court of law or in an administrative proceeding. If you refuse to
submit to this testing, your Georgia driver's license or privilege to drive on the highways
of this state may be suspended for a minimum period of one year and your refusal may be
used as evidence against you. If you submit to the state's testing, you are entitled to
additional chemical tests of your blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at your
own expense and from qualified personnel of your own choosing. Will you submit to the
state administered testing under the implied consent law?
SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
140. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen Assem.
141. See id. (proposing the addition of Code subsec!ion 40-5-202(b) to the existing Code).
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Specifically, SB 502 expressly emphasizes that "[t]he informing of or
failure to inform the accused person concerning the implied consent
law shall not affect the admissibility of such results in any case.,,142
These additions were expected to result in greater admissibility of
pertinent evidence, and reduce acquittals on the basis of mere
technicalities in notice procedures. 143 These additions, however, may
have ultimately played a significant role in the bill's inability to
gamer sufficient support in the Georgia House of Representatives, as
skeptics questioned the motive of such a change. 144
According to proponents of SB 502, another problem with existing
DUI laws is that the arrest requirement in the current law places
financial burdens on the cities and counties in Georgia. 145 After the
holding in Hough v. State, cities and counties are required to actually
arrest drivers prior to invoking implied consent for testing. 146 SB 502
would have allowed officers to invoke implied consent testing if there
were "reasonable grounds to believe" that the suspect was driving
under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other substances. 147 SB 502
thus removed the requirement that an actual arrest be made before
implied consent warnings are read and prevented law enforcement
officers from having to bring suspects to city and county facilities
prior to testing. 148 The bill also proposed the elimination the portion
of Code section 40-5-55 that does not require an arrest prior to
testing, which the Georgia Supreme Court held unconstitutional in
Cooper v. State. 149 The bill proposed the addition of a new section
emphasizing that in all circumstances, a finding of reasonable
grounds to believe a person was operating a motor vehicle under the
influence alcohol or drugs will authorize a law enforcement officer to

142. See id.
143. See Governor's Office of Highway Safety, supra note

55; Senate Audio, supra note 17 (remarks

of Sen. Hamrick).
144. See Interview with Sen. Bill Hamrick, supra note 52.
145. See Governor's Office of Highway Safety, supra note 55.

146. Id.
147. See SB

502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen Assern. (proposing the insertion of
new Code section 40-5-201 into existing DUI laws).
148. See Senate Audio, supra note 17; see a/so SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga.
Gen. Assem. (requiring a finding of probable cause prior to invoking implied consent).
149. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen Assem.
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"obtain ... chemical tests of a person's blood, breath, urine, or other
bodily substance. ,,150
Proponents of SB 502 also believe that the current law inhibits law
enforcement officers from gathering sufficient actual evidence to
convict drunk drivers. 151 Under existing common law, once a DUI
suspect refuses to consent to DUI testing, law enforcement officials
cannot use any other means of gathering evidence, and thus proving
that a driver was intoxicated becomes difficult. 152 SB 502 seeks to
allow for easier collection of evidence for the purposes of DUI
convictions by allowing for testing if a warrant is obtained, regardless
of whether consent is given by the driver. 153 If adopted, this addition
would make it more difficult for impaired drivers to avoid chemical
testing, and would thus make it easier for law enforcement officers to
collect incriminating evidence. 154 There do not appear to be any
constitutional restraints on such testing without actual consent, as
long as probable cause is present. 155
According to proponents of SB 502, further confusion exists in the
current DUI law as to when testing must occur in order to be
admissible. 156 Under the current Georgia Code section 40-5-55,
testing must occur "as soon as possible" for any person operating a
motor vehicle who is involved in any traffic accident resulting in
150. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen Assem. (proposing that a law
enforcement officer be authorized to conduct testing for the presence of alcohol or other drugs if there
are "reasonable grounds" to believe that the person operated a motor vehicle while impaired); see also
Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605, 607 (2003) (holding that to the extent that the implied consent statute
required chemical testing of the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in
serious injuries or fatalities, regardless of any determination of probable cause, it authorized
unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions).
151. See Governor's Office of Highway Safety, supra note 55.
152. State v. Collier. 612 S.E.2d 281, 284 (Ga. 2005); see Senate Audio, supra note 17 ("This bill will
allow law enforcement to get a warrant just as they can in any other case following constitutional
procedure to gather evidence.").
153. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the insertion ofa
new Code subsection 40-5-202(f), which reads, "[i]f the person refuses to submit to the state
administered test authorized by this Code section, nothing in this article shall be deemed to preclude the
acquisition or admission of such evidence by any means authorized by the Constitution or laws of this
state or of the United States"); see also Senate Audio, supra note 17.
154. See SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem.
155. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,767 (1966) (holding that the withdrawal of blood and
the use of a blood analysis do not violate a person's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination);
see also State v. Collier, 612 S.E.2d 281, 283 (Ga. 2004) (stating that the Georgia Constitution generally
does not protect citizens from the compelled testing of certain bodily substances and the use at trial of
the results of such compelled testing).
156. See O.C.G.A § 4O-5-55(a) (2005) (stating that testing must occur "as soon as possible").
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"serious injuries" or fatalities. 157 Under the language in the existing
law, there are discrepancies as to the meaning of "as soon as
possible" and "serious injuries.,,158 Courts have suppressed evidence
of test results where the State was unable to demonstrate that testing
occurred "as soon as practicable" under the circumstances, thus
allowing defendants to avoid convictions. 159 SB 502 removes the "as
soon as possible" and "serious injuries" language from the law
completely by striking existing Code section 40-5-55(a).160
Not everyone is convinced that the current DUI laws require
dramatic textual changes. 161 Opponents of SB 502 insist that there is
little ambiguity in Georgia's current implied consent laws and that
the drastic changes in the law proposed by SB 502 are
unnecessary.162 DUI attorney Robert Chestney believes that the
motivation behind SB 502 was that prosecutors did not want drivers
to be able to refuse testing, as they are able to do under Georgia's
current implied consent laws. 163 Mr. Chestney insists that legislators
went too far in eliminating the need for arrest in non-injury cases
prior to testing and eliminating the right to full disclosure about such
testing. l64 Further, Mr. Chestney points to the fact that SB 502 does
not include penalties for officers who fail to properly advise drivers
of their implied consent rightS. 165 This omission, Chestney insists,
eliminates the incentive for law enforcement officers to read the
implied consent warning at all, and thus leaves motorists with less
protection. 166
157. [d.
158. See Governor's Office of Highway Safety, supra note 55.
159. See State v. Becker, 523 S.E.2d 98, 100-01 (1999) (holding

that the trial court had insufficient
evidence for detennining whether urine and blood tests were given "as soon as practicable" under the
circumstances, absent evidence of how much time passed after the accident, and absent evidence as to
whether state patrol could have obtained urine sample at acloser patrol post).
160. See SB 502, §§ 2-20, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (removing from the Code
the text of the existing version of Code section 40-5-55).
161. See Interview with Robert Chestney, Mar. 22, 2006 [hereinafter Chestney Interview].
162. [d. (stating that the implied consent laws have "worked well for 40 years, and didn't need
fixing").
163. [d.
164. !d.; see

SB 502, §§ 2-20, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (striking Code
subsection 40-5-55(a), which was interpreted in Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003) as being
unconstitutional absent a showing of probable cause); see also SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate,
2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (adding Code section 40-5-202, which proposes that evidence cannot be
suppressed if the wrong implied consent notice is read to the defendant).
165. Chestney Interview, supra note 161.
166. [d.
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Robert Chestney's partner in the Atlanta-based Chestney-Hawkins
Law Firm, Michael M. Hawkins, expresses similar concerns about
SB 502 and the motivations behind the bill. 167 Mr. Hawkins predicts
that the 68-page bill would actually complicate the current state of
DUI laws, rather than simplify the laws as the proponents of the bill
suggest. 168 Senator Gloria Butler of the 55th District, the only Senator
who voted against the bill, expressed similar concern with the length
of the bill, stating that she was uncertain how such a lengthy bill
could simplify the law. 169
Mr. Hawkins also questions the legislature's motive in attempting
to alleviate burdens on police officers in obtaining evidence in DUI
cases. 170 The current law provides for drivers license suspensions
when a suspect refuses a test, as well as the admission into evidence
of the fact that the suspect refused.171 According to Mr. Hawkins,
there is no empirical evidence to show that the conviction rate in DUI
cases is lower in cases where the suspect refuses to take the test, and
thus the change is unnecessary. 172
Specifically, Hawkins finds that SB 502 is "far too broad" for a
variety of reasons: (1) The bill allows a police officer to have a blood
test forcibly administered without the citizen's consent;173 (2) the bill
eliminates liability for medical personnel who participate in the
forced blood and urine withdrawals; 174 (3) the bill eliminates the
167. Comments of Attorney Michael M. Hawkins on Behalf of the Criminal Defense Bar [hereinafter
Comments by Michael Hawkins] (''The proponents of SB 502 have not provided any evidence that the
proposed legislation will have any impact on reducing highway fatalities [or that] the changes proposed
are necessary to the prosecution ofDUI cases.").
168. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 ('The only results that SB 502 will achieve are
an increase in uncertainty for police officers and the driving public, and litigation that will ultimately do
more harm than good to the state's ability to hold impaired drivers responsible.").
169. Butler Interview, supra note 132 (stating that the bill was proposed as an implied consent bill,
but upon further review, it appeared that the majority of the bill did not pertain to implied consent at all).
170. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167.
171. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 40-6-392(d) (2005) ("In any criminal trial, the refusal of the defendant
to permit achemical analysis to be made of his blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time
of his arrest shall be admissible in evidence against him.").
172. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167.
173. Id. (stating that the bill will result in increased violence and tensions between citizens and police
officers); see SB 502 as passed, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem., § 1-2.
174. Id. (noting that because there are no statutes or regulations governing such conduct, a person
who is injured or dies as a result of such testing will have no legal redress); see also O.C.G.A. § 40-6392(a)(2) (2005) ( "No physician, registered nurse, or other qualified person or employer thereof shall
incur any civil or criminal liability as a result of the medically proper obtaining of such blood specimens
when requested in writing by a law enforcement officer.").
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requirement that a citizen be placed under arrest before testing can be
required; 175 (4) the bill eliminates notice of Georgia's "legal limit"
when an officer requests a driver's consent to testing; 176 (5) the bill
eliminates the requirement that a law enforcement officer notify a
driver that his license will be suspended if his blood/alcohol content
is over the legal limit;177 (6) the bill removes the requirement that a
driver be advised of his implied consent rights at the time of his
arrest; 178 (7) the bill excludes all remedies for citizens who were not
properly advised of their implied consent rights; 179 (8) the bill does
not allow a citizen a reasonable amount of time to contact an attorney
prior to deciding whether to submit to a chemical test;180 and (9) the
bill eliminates the requirement that a defendant be entitled to obtain
"full information" from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI)
regarding chemical testing. 181
Hawkins emphasizes that the original intent of Georgia's initial
implied consent laws, as written in 1968, was to minimize tensions
between law enforcement officers and citizens. 182 In Hawkins'
opinion, SB 502 would have actually resulted in increased violence
and tensions between citizens and police officers, as officers would
have been held to lower standards in informing drivers of their rights,
and officers would have been permitted to personally withdraw blood
175. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 (emphasizing that a person can be subdued by
police and forced to submit to a blood test, even where the person has not yet been arrested by police);
see SB 502, § 1-2, as passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the addition of Code
Section 40-5-201, which would allow for testing if there are "reasonable grounds" to believe that a
person was driving a motor vehicle while impaired).
176. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 ( "How can a person make an informed choice
about whether to submit to a chemical test when they are not told what is prohibited?"); see SB 502, as
passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the addition of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-202, which
includes the text for the implied consent notice).
177. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 (noting that the current implied consent notice
informs drivers that if their blood alcohol content is over the legal limit, they will lose their license for a
minimum of one year, and asking why the legislature is "deciding to keep that a secret"). Id.
178. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 (questioning the rationale behind not notifying a
citizen that he is under arrest until after his implied consent rights are invoked).
179. /d. (quoting SB 502 as stating that, "failure to inform the accused person concerning the implied
consent law shall not affect the admissibility of such results in any case"); see also SB 502, §§ 1-2, as
passed by the Senate, 2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing to add Code section 40-5-202(b».
180. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 (noting that at least ten states currently allow
citizens reasonable access to counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to a chemical test).
181. Id. (noting that the GBI is no longer required to publish its rules and regulations, and thus
citizens are deprived of full information regarding testing procedures).
182. Id.; see also 1968 Ga. Laws 448.

Published by Reading Room, 2006

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 18

244

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:223

for testing purposes.1 83 Tensions between law enforcement officers
and citizens may also have been heightened due to the fact that, under
the proposed bill, a citizen could be subdued by police and forced to
submit to a blood test, even where the person had not yet been
arrested by police. 184 Further, SB 502 would have left motorists
without legal redress if they were injured as the result of chemical
testing procedures. 185

Conclusion
In the end, the opponents of SB 502 prevailed, but the battle is far
from over.186 While the House did not pass SB 502, the proponents
of SB 502 and HB 1222 won a victory with the passage of an
amendment to HB 1275. 187 HB 1275 specifically expresses that
nothing in the Georgia nUl laws precludes the admission into
evidence of any test results obtained by voluntary consent or valid
search warrants. 188 This amendment is a direct response to the
holding in State v. Collier that where a one refuses to consent to
chemical testing, the State may not force chemical testing. 189 Under
the amendment to HB 1275, evidence of chemical testing is
admissible despite a defendant refusing to consent, provided that a
valid warrant is obtained. 190
Senator Hamrick, one of the co-sponsors of SB 502, is committed
to proposing additional nUl legislation in the future. 191 While
Senator Hamrick is uncertain of the specific reasons that the bill
183. See Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167.
184. Id.; see also SB 502, §§ 1-2, as passed by the Senate,

2006 Ga. Gen. Assem. (proposing the
addition of Code section 40-5-201, which would allow for testing if there are "reasonable grounds" to
believe that a person was driving a motor vehicle while impaired).
185. Comments by Michael Hawkins, supra note 167 (noting that because there are no statutes or
regulations governing negligent chemical testing, a person who is injured or dies as a result of such
testing will have no legal redress).
186. See Hamrick Interview, supra note 52 (stating that while SB 502 failed to gamer sufficient
approval in the House, Sen. Hamrick intends to introduce additional DUI legislation in the future).
187. See HB 1275, as adopted, 2006 Ga. Gen Assem.
188. See ld. § 2 (adding subsection d.1 to existing Code section 40-5-67.1, which states, "Nothing in
this Code section shall be deemed to preclude the acquisition or admission of evidence of a violation of
Code Section 40-6-391 if obtained by voluntary consent or a search warrant as authorized by the
Constitution or laws of this state or the United States."
189. See Hamrick Interview, supra note 52.
190. See HB 1275, as adopted, 2006 Ga. Gen Assem.
191. See Hamrick Interview, supra note 52.
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failed to garner sufficient support in the House Committee on
Judiciary Non-Civil, he opined that legislators were skeptical of the
"exclusionary rule," which proposed the admission into evidence of
chemical testing results, even where the implied consent warning was
not read exactly as written. 192 Having witnessed the nearly
unanimous support for SB 502 in the Senate, Senator Hamrick hopes
that in the future, legislation will be presented that a House
committee will find more acceptable. 193
Mark Begnaud, Andre Hendrick, Jared Lina, and Alfred Politzer

192. Seeid.
193. See id.
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